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NEW RULES FOR PROMISSORY FRAUD
Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass*

Experience is complex. The job of theory is to simplify and unify, to
abstract from the blooming, buzzing confusion and find some basic rules we can
use to guide us through it. Contract theory is a prime example. Theorists treat
legally binding promises as elemental speech acts, utterances that accomplish one
thing: put the promisor under an obligation to perform. This simplification has
allowed contract theory to focus on the deep questions that follow: When do
speech acts create such an obligation? How should we interpret the scope of the
duty undertaken? What should be the legal consequences of its violation? These
basic questions, along with a few others, have given rise to volumes of thought on
how legal liability should be structured.
But abstraction has its costs. In the case of contract theory, the costs have
included a tendency to ignore other aspects of the act of promising.1 Most notably,
theorists have by and large ignored the fact that, in everyday use, a promise is
often understood also to say something about the promisor’s state of mind—
namely, that she intends to do the act promised. This representation, like any other,
might be true or false, and, if false, the promisor might be held liable for fraud.
*
Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Associate Professor of Law,
Georgetown Law Center. This Article is a revised version of a paper originally presented at
the Dan B. Dobbs Conference on Economic Tort Law hosted by the University of Arizona
James E. Rogers College of Law in Tucson, Arizona, on March 3–4, 2006. Articles from the
Conference are collected in this issue, Volume 48 Number 4, of the Arizona Law Review.
The authors would like to thank the participants at the Conference for their very helpful
comments on the draft “Prestatement” below.
1.
While contract theorists have largely ignored the multiple semantic
dimensions of a promise, the idea is hardly unusual from the perspective of philosophy of
language. Jules Coleman, for instance, uses promises as an example of the semantic
complexity:
Suppose, for example, that I say to Smith, “I promise to meet you for
lunch today.” Understanding this as a promise means knowing that it
warrants a variety of inferences—for example that Smith expects me to
show up for lunch; that I predict I will show up for lunch; that I have a
duty to show up; that Smith has a right that I show up, and so on. The
content of the concept “promise” is revealed in the range of inferences
warranted by the belief that a promise has been made; and to grasp the
concept of a promise is to be able to project the inferences it warrants.
Jules L. Coleman, Crimes and Transactions, 88 CAL. L. REV. 921, 929 (2000).
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Courts, on the other hand, awake every morning to find the mess of the
world left on their doorstep in a burning paper bag. Plaintiffs have brought to their
attention that promises also have a representational dimension, and the courts have
crafted the doctrine of promissory fraud to address it. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts formulates the rule for promissory fraud as follows: “Since a promise
necessarily carries with it the implied assertion of an intention to perform it
follows that a promise made without such an intention is fraudulent and actionable
in deceit . . . .”2 That is, a promisor who enters a contract without an intent to
perform commits promissory fraud and, consequently, can be held liable in tort as
well as contract. Our recent book, Insincere Promises, attempts to throw some
theoretical light on the well-established action for promissory fraud.3 The book’s
appendix contains a draft “Prestatement” of how we believe the law of promissory
fraud should look. This Essay is an expanded version of that Prestatement,
tweaking some of the rules and adding extensive comments in the style of the
Restatements.
The format of the Restatements has the advantage of permitting a crisp
summary of our central recommendations, and we believe our Prestatement can be
read without introduction. But the style also has a leveling effect, since every rule
or idea is treated as more or less equal. We therefore want to take a few paragraphs
to highlight what we see as our most important and immediately realizable
recommendations, and to integrate some of the comments we received from
conference participants.
The reforms we recommend are by and large independent of one another.
That is, they do not need to be implemented all at once, and there is plenty of room
for incremental progress. As an initial matter, here are three easy steps courts
could take right away that, in our opinion, would result in a significant
improvement in the law.
First, courts should drop their insistence that every promise represents an
intent to perform, and should instead treat that representation merely as a default
(Prestatement § 101). Courts presently assume that every promise says the same
thing: The promisor intends to perform. This mandatory rule should be instead a
default. A promisor could then disclaim the representation of intent to perform.
And even where a defendant–promisor has not explicitly opted out of the default,
she should be allowed to offer evidence that, given the context of the agreement,
there was no such representation. Such context can include industry norms, local
practice or the history of dealings between the parties. Where a promise does not
represent an intent to perform, the promisor will not be liable for promissory fraud
if she has an undisclosed conditional intent to perform, or an intent to perform or
pay damages.
Courts should, however, retain one mandatory rule: While some promises
do not represent an intent to perform, every promise represents at least that the
promisor does not intend not to perform—that is, she is not entering the contract
2.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c (1977); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 171 cmt. b (1981).
3.
IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF
MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005).
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planning breach. The rule here turns on the distinction between not intending to do
something and intending not to do it (Prestatement § 105 cmt. a). A promisor who
disclaims the default representation of an intent to perform may not intend to
perform, but should still be liable for promissory fraud if she intends not to
perform.
Second, courts faced with claims of promissory fraud should pay more
attention to scienter (Prestatement §§ 103 cmt. b & 104 cmt. b). Today courts
generally assume that because the promisor must have known her own intent, any
misrepresentation of that intent was necessarily a knowing, or intentional,
misrepresentation. As we explain, this inference is unwarranted, from which
follow two recommendations. The first is defendant-friendly: Courts considering
promissory fraud claims should insist on sufficient evidence of scienter—that the
misrepresentation in question was knowing or reckless—and should readily grant
motions for summary judgment when such evidence has not been submitted
(Prestatement § 104(b)). The second is plaintiff-friendly: The possibility of nonknowing promissory misrepresentations opens the door for claims of
nonfraudulent or negligent promissory misrepresentation, a cause of action that
courts have until now failed to recognize (Prestatement § 103).
The third quick improvement would be to recognize that promissory
representations of intent are material only because they say something about the
objective probability of performance, and to interpret a representation of intent to
perform as saying, absent evidence to the contrary, that there is at least a fiftypercent chance that the promisor will perform (Prestatement §§ 100 cmt. a, 101(b)
& 107). Our point about the importance of the objective probability of
performance is a corollary of Karl Llewellyn’s objection to the Holmesian heresy:
“[T]he essential purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual
performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus
the right to win a lawsuit . . . .”4 A promisee cares about whether or not the
promisor intends to perform because he wants to know whether or not she will
perform. Because representations of intent are in this context also representations
about the objective probability of performance, a plaintiff should be permitted to
show that the representation was false by showing that the actual probability of
performance was in fact lower than the representation of intent suggested.
In order to simplify the factfinding task here, courts should adopt the
following interpretive default: Absent evidence to the contrary, a representation of
intent to perform also represents that there is at least a fifty-percent chance that the
promisor will perform. That is, a promise presumptively represents not only an
intent to perform but thereby also that performance is more likely than not. This is
only a default. It is a familiar fact that some intentions are more likely to succeed
than others, and the parties should be free to argue that the promissory
representation at issue suggested a higher or lower probability of performance.
Where the parties do not make such arguments (whether by choice or necessity),
our fifty-percent default allows courts to address the objective probability of
performance by posing a simple question to the jury: “Was it more likely than not

4.

U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (2004).
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that the promisor would perform?” If the answer is “No,” then the representation
of intent misrepresented the objective probability of performance.5
This last recommended reform brings us to a larger point that bears
additional emphasis: The single act of promising can, and often does, say and do
many things at once. We have focused on a cluster of representations relevant to
the objective probability of performance, which include representations of intent,
warranting representations that the promisor is so likely to perform it is in the
promisee’s interest to rely, and express statements about the probability of
performance. But a promise might say other things as well. For example,
especially where a contractual promise does not represent an intent to perform, it
might represent that the promisor intends to pay damages in the case of breach and
spare the promisee the expense of a lawsuit. Even promises that represent an intent
to perform might also say something about the promisor’s intent should she
breach, since breach is always a possibility. The promise might represent, for
instance, that the promisor does not plan to hide any breaches or otherwise to
obstruct the promisee’s ability to recover. Perhaps the law should also recognize
these representations as interpretive defaults backed by the law of promissory
fraud. Our Prestatement should not be read as the last word on the subject.6
We should also say a few words about our recommended measures of
damages. It is no doubt true that the formula for optimal damage multipliers is
“simpler to state than to apply,”7 and we received several thoughtful questions at
the conference about its practicability. Multipliers appear in two places in our
Prestatement. First, in determining the appropriate compensatory award for
nonfraudulent promissory misrepresentation, we recommend multiplying actual
damages by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement (Prestatement
§ 108(a)(1)). Here we adopt a solution for the problem of underenforcement that
has wide currency in the economic literature and which is in no way specific to
promissory fraud.8 It is a reasonable question whether juries are equipped to assess
5.
Our fifty-percent default does something to specify what is, in extra-legal
practice, the relatively imprecise representation of an intent to perform (imprecise in terms
of what it says about the objective probability of performance). Richard Craswell has
recently suggested that the common law should go further and take a regulatory approach
that attempts to incentivize disclosure of information that is optimal both in terms of
quantity and format. Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation
and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565 (2006). We wonder
whether in most contract contexts (excluding examples like consumer contracts), this matter
cannot be left to the parties themselves, who have a reason to insist on optimal information.
Whether or not this is so, however, we would also observe that so long as a cheap, vague
representation—such as “I intend to perform”—does the job, it would be wrong to push for
more precision or to require the parties to say much more.
6.
For a framework for thinking about promissory representations of an intent
to cooperate in recovery, see Gregory Klass, Contracting for the Case of Breach: SecondOrder Duties and Extracompensatory Remedies (Sept. 28, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=933648.
7.
Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244 (2000) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
8.
The canonical statement of the idea can be found in A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
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the probability of enforcement, or whether they will put aside their biases when
determining the appropriate multiplier.9 We believe that allowing for multipliers in
those cases where detection is particularly unlikely would probably do more good
than harm. But the point is not central to our project, and our proposal that courts
recognize a new tort of nonfraudulent promissory misrepresentation does not
depend on using a multiplier.
Multipliers also appear in our proposed calculation of punitive damages
for promissory fraud, which we suggest be the dollar-value of the defendant’s gain
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement (Prestatement
§ 109(a)(2)). Again one might raise doubts about jury competence. Here, however,
we are even more sanguine. Punitive damages are designed to fully deter bad
behavior. Since there is no such thing as too much deterrence here, a jury can be
instructed that, in the case of uncertainty, it should err on the side of awarding
more rather than less. Of course, awards that are too high by orders of magnitude
violate norms of fairness and threaten to deter otherwise valuable behavior. While
this is a good argument for careful judicial policing of punitive damage awards
here as elsewhere, we doubt that the measure we propose—which is calibrated to
award the minimum necessary to deter bad behavior—will result in unreasonably
high awards.
Finally, we can locate a few of our recommendations in relation to other
papers that were presented at this conference. Andrew Klein suggests using
comparative fault to replace or weaken the traditional requirement that the
plaintiff’s reliance on a fraudulent representation was justified.10 That reform could
easily be applied to promissory fraud as well and provides a nice supplement to
our theory. Where a promisee knows more about the probability of performance
than does the promisor, she cannot show justifiable reliance on the promissory
representation, and should not be able to recover for promissory fraud
(Prestatement § 104(a)(5)). Thus, for instance, a credit card company that is aware
that an applicant is a terrible credit risk and charges an accordingly higher interest
rate might have difficulty showing reasonable reliance on the cardholder’s
representation of intent. Under Klein’s proposal, it might nonetheless be entitled to
partial recovery through the apportionment of fault.
Deborah DeMott recommends a new test, based on justifiable
expectations of loyalty, for when one party owes a fiduciary duty to another.11 The
reasonable expectation of loyalty provides a nice gloss on what we have termed
“unidirectional or unbalanced relationships of trust” (Prestatement § 102 cmt. d).
But while DeMott is interested in the way fiduciary relationships give rise to
9.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2111–12 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi,
The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety
Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 327–32 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and
Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49
(1998).
10.
Andrew R. Klein, Comparative Fault and Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 999
(2006).
11.
Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations
of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006).
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special duties, we are interested in another use courts might make of them. The
existence of a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship can serve as evidence of
what a promise represented. A reasonable expectation of loyalty can be evidence
that the act of promising represented that the probability of performance was so
high, that the promisee could reasonably rely on it. Not only do fiduciary
relationships give rise to fiduciary duties, but they can also serve as evidence of
the performance or nonperformance of other, more broadly applicable duties.
Lastly, several papers in this conference addressed the scope and reasons
for the economic loss doctrine.12 The economic loss doctrine is, among other
things, a tool for patrolling the border between tort and contract. Our argument, on
the other hand, is that some forms of tort liability can play a beneficial role in the
contracting context. One explanation of the difference is that the economic loss
doctrine has traditionally applied only to negligence and strict liability. But in
recent years, several jurisdictions have expanded the doctrine to bar some fraud
claims as well.13 The doctrine is developing, and it is not clear that these courts
would apply the rule to bar promissory fraud claims as well, which fall into the
category of fraud in the inducement.14 Be that as it may, we doubt whether these
holdings make sense under any coherent reading of the economic loss doctrine.
For the present, however, we leave the question for those who have proposed
coherent readings of the doctrine.

A DRAFT PRESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF INSINCERE PROMISING
100.

Promissory misrepresentation

(a) A promissory representation is a representation made, implicitly or explicitly,
by the promisor at the time of promising that concerns the probability that the

12.
See Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No
Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773 (2006); Dan B. Dobbs, An
Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713 (2006); Jay M.
Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813 (2006);
Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 749 (2006); Oscar S. Gray, Some Thoughts on “The Economic Loss Rule” and
Apportionment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 897 (2006); Helmut Koziol, Recovery for Economic Loss
in the European Union, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 871 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Common-Law
Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2006); Ellen S.
Pryor, The Economic Loss Rule and Liability Insurance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 905 (2006); Travis
M. Wheeler, Note, Negligent Injury to Reputation: Defamation Priority and the Economic
Loss Rule, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1103 (2006).
13.
See generally R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract:
Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2000); Steven C. Tourek et al., Bucking the “Trend”: The
Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of
Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 IOWA L. REV. 875 (1999).
14.
But New York courts, many of which take an even stricter approach to the
line between contract and tort, have rejected promissory fraud claims as not far enough
removed from contractual duties. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud, N.Y.
ST. B.J., May 2006.
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promise will be performed. Representations of intention concern the
probability of performance.
(b) A promissory misrepresentation is a promissory representation that is false at
the time it is made.
Comment:
a. Probability of performance. The action for promissory fraud has addressed
traditionally only misrepresentations of promisor intent at the time of promising.
The promisor’s initial intent, however, is material only as an indicator of the
probability that she will perform. A promisor who intends to perform is more
likely to do so than a promisor who does not intend to perform, which is why the
promisee, who is faced with the decision whether or not to enter into a contract or
otherwise rely, cares about promisor intent. A promisor might, however, represent
information about the probability of her performance in other ways. Such
representations can give rise to the same harm as misrepresentation of intent and,
in appropriate cases, should give rise to similar legal liability.
b. Implicit and explicit representations. A promise is primarily not a representation
about how the world is, but an act that puts the promisor under a new obligation.
But a single speech act, such as a promise, often has multiple meanings. In most
cases, a promise also implicitly represents that the promisor intends to perform,
and perhaps other things about the probability of performance as well. A promisor
might, instead of or in addition to any implicit representations, explicitly make
such representations, using words like “I fully intend to perform,” “There is a
ninety-percent chance of performance,” or “You can safely rely on my
performing.”
c. At the time of promising. A promissory representation is not a prediction but
concerns the present probability of performance. That is, it represents the state of
the world at the time of promising, and is therefore true or false when it is made.
Consequently, the truth or falsity of a promissory representation does not depend
on whether or not the promisor performs her promise.

101.

Promissory representations of intention

(a) Absent contrary circumstances, a promise represents that the promisor intends
to perform. Contrary circumstances can include a party’s explicit disavowal of
such a representation, the relationship between the parties, local practice, and
the promisor’s statement to the promisee of what the probability of her
performance is.
(b) Absent evidence to the contrary, a court should interpret a representation of
intent to perform to mean that there is at least a fifty-percent chance that the
promisor will perform.
(c) Every promise necessarily represents that the promisor does not intend not to
perform.
Comment:
a. Default representation of intent. Absent contrary evidence, the law should
interpret a promise to represent that the promisor intends to perform. This default
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is majoritarian, as most promisors intend to perform and want to share that
information with promisees. The default is also information-forcing, since it gives
a promisor who does not intend to perform a new reason to expressly tell the
promisee that she does not, for by doing so she avoids potential liability for
promissory misrepresentation.
b. Permissible conditional intentions. The possibility of breach is part of the
background understanding of the parties, and it would be unreasonable to expect
either promisor or promisee to anticipate performance come what may. Thus a
promisor’s default representation of an intent to perform is not a representation to
perform under all possible future states of the world—an intent to perform “no
matter what.” As an initial matter, the doctrine of excuses recognizes that certain
changed circumstances (e.g., impractability, frustration) may excuse performance.
A promisor’s initial intent to perform may therefore be conditioned on the nonoccurrence of such changed circumstances without misrepresentation. Second, a
representation of an intent to perform might not be false even if the promisor
believes she will likely breach in some circumstances that would not excuse
performance. Such a conditional intention is permissible so long as the promisor
does not have a special reason to believe that such circumstances are likely to
occur, and such eventualities are not particularly salient to the transaction. In
addition, an intent to perform that is conditioned on the non-occurrence of an
undesirable event, such as increased production costs, is more permissible than one
conditioned on the nonoccurrence of a desired event, such as a better offer from a
third party.
c. Comparison to present doctrine. Courts and commentators presently assume that
every promise represents an intent to perform. That is, the current doctrine imposes
on promisors a mandatory representation of intent. Yet there are situations in
which a promisor wants to undertake a legal obligation to perform, though she is
unsure whether she will actually do so. So long as such a promisor does not
misrepresent her intent—that is, so long as the promisee is on notice that the
promisor may not intend to perform—there is no reason to deter such a promisor
from entering into the transaction.
d. Contracting around the default. The clearest way a promisor can opt out of the
default representation of an intent to perform is to inform the promisee that she
makes no such representation. There are, however, contexts where this is already
clear to both parties—because of an industry norm, local practice, or the course of
dealings between the parties. Finally, if the promisor represents precisely what the
probability of her performance is (e.g., “There is a seventy-five-percent chance I
will perform”), any representation of intent is of little added use to the promisee,
and the promise should be interpreted as making no representation as to promisor
intent.
e. The fifty-percent default. As a representation of intent, a promise also says
something about the objective probability of performance—namely, that
performance is at least as likely as the chances of the promisor realizing an
intention of that sort. What any given expression of intent says about the future
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varies depending on context and on the sort of act intended. The habitual opium
smoker’s statement that she intends to quit suggests a lower probability that she
will realize her intention than the dutiful roommate’s report that she intends to do
the dishes. Evidence of context and the parties’ background understanding can
indicate that the expression of intent represented a higher or lower objective
probability of performance.
Where the parties do not introduce such evidence—whether because it
does not exist or because they have chosen not to—the court should interpret a
representation of intent to perform to mean that there is at least a fifty-percent
chance that the promisor will perform. That is, if performance was more likely
than not, then the representation of an intent to perform did not misrepresent the
objective probability of performance.
f. Mandatory representation of no intent not to perform. A promisor may not
intend to perform a promise because she is unsure whether or not she will perform
(e.g., she intends to perform only under certain undisclosed conditions), or because
she intends not to perform (under any probable future state of the world). In the
latter case, if the promisee is aware of the promisor’s intent—that is, if the
promisee has not been misled—then the promisee is contracting for damages
rather than performance. Such transactions create no value that could not be
realized by an express contract for the anticipated damage amount. And they
impose significant costs, which include both the residual possibility of promisee
mistake and publicly provided adjudication and enforcement. Consequently, there
is nothing to be gained by permitting a promisor to enter into a transaction she
intends not to perform. Such promisors are deterred by a mandatory minimum
representation: every promise represents that the promisor does not intend not to
perform. As noted in the first sentence of this comment, this minimum
representation does not entail that the promisor intends to perform.

102.

Warranting promissory representations

(a) Unless a promisor warns the promisee that she does not believe that it is in the
promisee’s interest to rely on her performance or states to the promisee what
the probability of her performance is, her promise represents that she does not
believe that the probability of her performance is so low that it is not in the
promisee’s interest to rely on her performing.
(b) Circumstances indicating that a promise represents that the probability of
performance is so great that it is in the promisee’s objective interest to rely on
that performance can include explicit statements, local practice and the
relationship between the parties.
Comment:
a. Warranting promissory representations. In addition to representations of intent,
a promisor can say something about the probability of performance by comparing
it to the promisee’s participation constraint, that is, to the minimum probability of
performance that would make entering into the transaction a good bet for the
promisee. Thus a promisor might assure the promisee that the probability of
performance is so high that it is in the promisee’s interests to undertake significant
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reliance costs, though those costs will provide no return in the case of
nonperformance.
b. The default warranting representation. Most promisors do not want to warrant
that the transaction is in the promisee’s best interest. First, a promisor may not
know enough about the promisee’s participation constraint to make such a
representation. Second, other information about the probability of performance
(e.g., the promisor’s intent to perform) may suffice to assure the promisee that it is
in the promisee’s interest to rely. Courts can and should, however, adopt a more
modest default: that the promisor does not believe that it is not in the promisee’s
interest to rely. A promisor who cannot estimate the promisee’s participation
constraint should have no belief as to whether or not it is in the promisee’s interest
to rely. Such a promisor accords with the default representation. But a promisor
who believes that the probability of performance is so low that it is not in the
promisee’s interest to rely is given a new reason to share that information with the
promisee, else face liability for a promissory misrepresentation. Cf. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 151 (unilateral mistake); id. § 161(c) (non-disclosure as
equivalent to assertion when disclosure would correct a mistake); UCC 2-315
(implied warranty of fitness).
c. Contracting around the default. A promisor who believes that it is not in the
promisee’s interest to rely can avoid the default representation by informing the
promisee of that fact. Alternatively, a promisor who informs the promisee of just
what the probability of performance is has, in the normal case, provided the
promisee with enough information to determine for herself whether the transaction
is in her interest. Consequently, such a representation also suffices to opt out of the
default.
d. Fully warranting representations. While most promisors would not wish to
warrant that the probability of performance is so high that it is in the promisee’s
interest to rely, as described in comment a, some promisors do wish to make such
representations. An express statement such as “You can count on me,” is such a
representation and, if false, can give rise to liability for promissory
misrepresentation or fraud. Alternatively, where there exists a unidirectional or
unbalanced relationship of trust between promisor and promisee, such as in a
fiduciary relationship, the promise should be interpreted as implicitly making such
a warranting representation.

103.

Nonfraudulent promissory misrepresentation

A plaintiff who claims promissory misrepresentation must show that: (1) the
defendant made a promissory representation; (2) that representation was, at the
time it was made, false; (3) it was foreseeable that someone in the claimant’s
position would act or refrain from acting in reliance on the representation; (4) the
claimant justifiably relied on the representation, which is to say that, because of
the representation, the claimant reasonably expected that the promise would be
performed and relied on that expectation; and (5) the claimant suffered damages as
a proximate result of his reliance.
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Comment:
a. The elements of promissory misrepresentation. The above elements of
(nonfraudulent) promissory misrepresentation are no different from the elements
of the generic action for (nonfraudulent) misrepresentation, the only difference
being that the action is limited to promissory misrepresentations.
b. Comparison to present doctrine. Because a promisor cannot be mistaken as to
her own intent, most courts assume that every misrepresentation of intent is
perforce an intentional misrepresentation, and therefore that all promissory
misrepresentations are fraudulent. That assumption overlooks four significant
cases. First, where a promise is made by an agent representing a principal, that
agent can be mistaken as to the principal’s intent. Second, a promisor might be
mistaken as to the meaning of her promise, and therefore unwittingly intend to do
something other than what the promise obliges her to do. Third, while a promisor
cannot be mistaken as to her intent, she may be mistaken as to the objective
probability of her performance. The representation of an intent to perform is also a
representation about the objective probability of performance, and the latter
representation may be false even if the former is not. Fourth, some promissory
representations are not representations of intent, but say something about the
probability of performance by communicating other facts. The assumption about
the transparency of intent says nothing about these representations, which concern
facts about which the promisor might simply be mistaken.
In any of these four cases, if the promisor’s mistake was reasonable, or a
matter of mere negligence, there should be no liability for promissory fraud. The
plaintiff’s case may, however, satisfy the elements of nonfraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation—a possibility courts presently fail to recognize.
c. Proximate harm and breach. In all but the most unusual case, the only possible
proximate harm of a promissory misrepresentation is the harm stemming from the
defendant’s failure to perform. In the normal case, therefore, nonperformance or
breach is an element of promissory misrepresentation and promissory fraud.

104.

Promissory fraud

(a) The action for promissory fraud is a species of the action for deceit. In order
to prove promissory fraud, a claimant must show that: (1) the defendant made
a promissory representation; (2) the representation was, at the time it was
made, false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false or acted
with reckless disregard of its truth; (4) it was foreseeable that someone in the
claimant’s position would act or refrain from acting in reliance on the
representation; (5) the claimant justifiably relied on the representation, which
is to say that, because of the representation, the claimant reasonably expected
that the promise would be performed and relied on that expectation; and (6)
the claimant suffered damages as a proximate result of his reliance.
(b) Proof that a promisor did not intend to perform or that a promisor intended not
to perform, which can satisfy (2), might not be sufficient to show that a
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promissory misrepresentation was made knowingly or recklessly, i.e., might
not satisfy (3).
Comment:
a. The elements of promissory fraud. The above elements of promissory fraud are
the same as the elements for the generic action of deceit, the only difference being
that the action is limited to promissory misrepresentations.
b. Comparison to present doctrine. As noted above, supra § 103 cmt. b, courts
wrongly assume that a promissory misrepresentation is necessarily an intentional
misrepresentation. As a result, when faced with a claim of promissory fraud, courts
generally fail to insist on separate proof of scienter—that the misrepresentation
was made knowingly or with reckless disregard of its truth. This is an error and
courts should require evidence of scienter.

105.

The crime of false promise

A defendant may be found guilty of the crime of false promise only if there is
proof that at the time of promising that the defendant intended not to perform and
the evidence excludes all other hypotheses to a moral certainty. Consequently, a
promisor who had an undisclosed conditional intention to perform (an intention to
perform if C), who has an undisclosed disjunctive intention to perform (an
intention to perform or to X), or who had no intention with respect to performance
is not guilty of false promise.
Comment:
a. Intent not to perform vs. no intent to perform. A promisor might neither intend
to perform nor intend not to perform—for example, if she intends to perform or
pay damages, or intends to perform only under certain undisclosed conditions.
Under the default interpretation of a promise, such a promisor may well be liable
for promissory fraud, since she has represented an intent she does not have. But
because such a promisor does not intend not to perform, she is not guilty of the
crime of false promise. Criminal liability is reserved only for cases where the
promisor enters into the transaction intending not to perform. Such cases are both
more egregious, and subject to more reliable proof.
b. Moral certainty. Proof of the crime of false promise turns primarily on proof of
the promisor’s initial intent. Evidence of such intent can be equivocal. In order to
avoid chilling promissory transactions, the evidentiary bar should be higher than
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Instead, the prosecution should be
required to prove bad initial intent to a moral certainty.

106.

Proof of intent

(a) The nonperformance of a promise, while probative as to the defendant’s intent
at the time of promising, is never dispositive as to that intent.
(b) Other evidence of an initial intent not to perform can include: (1) a short time
or lack of changed circumstances between the last promissory representation
and nonperformance; (2) the fact that the defendant made no preparations or
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attempts to perform; (3) evidence that the defendant knew at the time of
promising that she would be unable or unwilling to perform; (4) other
deceptions by, or actions of, the defendant that suggest a scheme to defraud;
and (5) similar broken promises by the defendant without excuse or
explanation.
(c) Motive evidence that the defendant believed at the time of promising that it
would be in her best interest to perform strongly suggests that she did intend
to perform.
Comment:
a. The relevance of nonperformance. The mere fact of breach is never sufficient to
show bad intent at the time of promising, since the defendant may have changed
her mind. Nor is it enough to show a low probability of performance at the time of
promising. It is, however, relevant to both.
b. Circumstantial evidence of intent. The only direct evidence of a promisor’s
initial intent are her own statements. Because such statements are rarely
forthcoming, most cases turn on circumstantial evidence. While it is impossible to
draw up a definitive list of the forms of such circumstantial evidence, subsections
(b) and (c) describe several categories of commonly salient evidence. It is to be
observed that the relevance of any type of evidence is often highly context
sensitive. For example, in one case a defendant’s partial performance might be
strong evidence of an initial intent to perform, while in another, minimal initial
steps in performing might indicate that the defendant was stringing the promisee
along, hoping to delay a suit for breach of contract.

107.

Proof of the probability of performance

Evidence that the probability of performance was lower than represented can
include: (1) the promisor’s intent at the time of promising; (2) circumstances at the
time of promising suggesting that the promisor would likely not be able or would
choose not to perform; and (3) empirical evidence of the promisor’s past
performance record.
Comment:
a. The relevance of the probability of performance. Not every promissory
representation is a representation of intent, for it is possible to say something about
the probability of performance by representing other facts. See supra § 100 cmt. a.
Moreover, a promisor who intends to perform may nonetheless misrepresent the
objective probability of her performance at the time of promising. See supra § 103
cmt. b. In either case, a plaintiff can show misrepresentation without showing bad
initial intent. While the objective probability of performance turns in part on
promisor intent, it also depends on whether the promisor will be able to perform
and whether it is likely that the promisor will choose to change her mind about
performance. Proof of a low probability of performance may also be had by way of
scientific induction, from past similar breaches.
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Remedies for nonfraudulent promissory
misrepresentation

(a) A claimant who has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant made a promissory misrepresentation is entitled:
(1) to recover all of the costs that he has reasonably incurred in reliance on
the promissory representation, as well as his litigation costs, all of which,
where there is proof that the type of promissory misrepresentation in
question is particularly likely to go unnoticed or to evade legal sanction,
may be multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement;
and
(2) to rescind the contract.
(b) A contractual agreement that one or more parties shall not be liable for
nonfraudulent promissory misrepresentation is enforceable. A contractual
agreement that nonfraudulent promissory misrepresentation shall entitle the
deceived party to any or all of the remedies for promissory fraud is
enforceable.
Comment:
a. The general measure of damages. The default measure of damages for
nonfraudulent promissory misrepresentation is the plaintiff’s reliance costs.
Because recovery is in tort, certain contractual limits on damages do not apply, and
a plaintiff may be able to recover, inter alia, emotional or other nonpecuniary
damages and nonforeseeable consequential damages. Suspending the otherwise
applicable limits on breach-of-contract damages does not threaten their general
effectiveness, since liability for promissory misrepresentation is the exception
rather than the rule.
b. Damage multiplier. A promissory representation is made to convince the
promisee to rely on performance. Liability for promissory misrepresentation
promotes that purpose by assuring the promisee that she will be able to recover her
reliance costs if the promissory representation is false. The proper functioning of
this mechanism, however, depends on the probability of enforcement—which may
be particularly low in the case of promissory misrepresentation, given difficulties
of proof. This difficulty is addressed by the use of a damage multiplier.
c. Avoiding or increasing liability. An agreement may exclude one or more parties
from liability for promissory misrepresentation, so as to protect the promisor
against her reasonable or negligent mistake as to the probability of performance.
Alternatively, a party who wishes to provide additional assurances as to the
veracity of her promissory representations may choose to undertake greater
liability for any nonfraudulent representation, including the remedies for
promissory fraud.

109.

Remedies for promissory fraud

(a) A claimant who has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has committed promissory fraud has the option either:
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(1) to recover her reliance costs as described in § 108(a)(1);
(2) to recover punitive damages in the amount of the defendant’s gain from
the misrepresentation multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of
enforcement; or
(3) to demand specific performance.
(b) Where a contract is enforceable on its face, an agreement that one or more
parties shall not be liable for promissory fraud shall not be enforced. A
contractual stipulation that, in the case of promissory fraud, punitive damages
shall be assessed in a certain amount or that the remedy will be specific
performance is enforceable.
Comment:
a. Damages. So long as the probable damage amount is equal to or greater than the
defendant’s anticipated gain from the misrepresentation, the threat of legal liability
should serve to deter promissory fraud. This can be accomplished by giving the
successful plaintiff a choice between various monetary damage measures, as well
as specific performance. As between multiplied reliance damages (§ 109(a)(1))
and the multiplied amount of the defendant’s gain (§ 109(a)(2)), a promissory
fraud plaintiff will always choose the higher amount. Similarly, a plaintiff will
request specific performance (§ 109(a)(3)) only where that remedy is worth more
to her than either measure of money damages. This choice of damage measures
therefore ensures adequate deterrence and full compensation.
b. Attempts to limit liability. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to contract out of
liability for promissory fraud. The promisor who is worried about such liability
can instead expressly disclaim any representations as to her intent or the
probability of performance, except for the mandatory representation that she does
not intend not to perform.

110.

Relationship to damages for breach of contract

An award of monetary damages for promissory misrepresentation or promissory
fraud does not forestall separate recovery for breach of contract. But a claimant’s
reliance interest may be recovered only once. Consequently, a finding of breach of
contract will only allow additional recovery of the difference between the
claimant’s expectation and reliance interests. An award of rescission for
promissory misrepresentation or specific performance for promissory fraud
precludes recovery of damages for breach of contract.

111.

Pleading requirements for promissory fraud

In all averments of promissory fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud must be
stated with particularity. A complaint must also state facts sufficient to create a
prima facie case of a promissory misrepresentation and that the promisor made that
misrepresentation knowingly or recklessly. Where a plaintiff fails to plead
promissory fraud with particularity, the claim should be dismissed without
prejudice.

